economic and structural shifts. All told, Kauders makes a convincing argument against the "psychological explanations" of German postwar repression of memory, and his book will be of interest to scholars of postwar German society and culture as well as those interested in more general issues of democracy. As Carole Fink acknowledges in the opening pages of Defending the Rights of Others, her book is not the first "to investigate the international dimensions of the minorities question in Eastern Europe" (p. xvii). Yet what distinguishes her impressive study from others is its broad compass-a sixty-year span starting with the 1878 Congress of Berlin and ending on the eve of the Second World War-as well an exceptional diversity of primary sources. The author has crafted an engaging narrative of the triangular relationship in which the Great Powers, the East European "minority states," and the advocates of minority rights are inextricably entangled. As such, her book carefully documents the advent of modern human rights diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century. Fink's assessment of this diplomacy is negative overall. The quest for international protection of minorities in Eastern Europe was hampered by international diplomacy's inability to supersede the sovereignty of nation-states, and marred by chronic irresolution. The Great Powers, despite their relative sensitivity to the plight of Jews and others, never sought to create a universal protection system but instead limited their involvement to stopgap or unenforceable measures. Revisionist powers, for their part, used the issue of minority protection to advance their particular irredentist or territorial claims: German leaders from Bismarck to Hitler continuously championed minority rights for these purposes. Equally detrimental to the protection of minorities was the fact that the successor states (such as Romania after 1878 or Poland after 1918) easily evaded the demands made on them by the Western powers. The author's reappraisal of the influence exerted by international lobbying and advocacy is also sobering. Outspoken yet ideologically divided, Jewish leaders ultimately had little sway over Great Power diplomats and national public opinions; the vibrant internationalist activism of the 1920s, which had pinned its hopes on the League of Nations, became increasingly marginalized in the 1930s. The author concludes that there were no alternatives, however, to the "hollow multinational treaties" signed in Berlin (1878) and Paris (1919) , for "behind these formal agreements lay the old structure of Great-Power condominium that controlled Eastern Europe" (p. 363). After 1933, the swift death of the old Concert of Europe destroyed the hopes for a "fairer international order." Though often identified with the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the diplomacy of minority protection has earlier antecedents. After the Congress of Vienna (1815), Fink reminds us, statements on national, religious, or civil rights had become standard. Hence the unorthodox yet historically sound starting point of the book: the 1878 Congress of Berlin and its minority protection clause continued a trend in nineteenthcentury diplomacy but also marked a decisive turning point. While devising the partition of the Balkans, the Great Powers insisted on guarantees for minorities in the newly independent states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and above all, Romania, where antisemitic discrimination was particularly blatant. A careful blend of realpolitik and timid humanitarianism, the Berlin Treaty stipulated that in Romania religious creed should not be used to justify discrimination. Ultimately, in full defiance of this provision, only 200 of 230,000 Romanian Jews were granted citizenship. Though the author describes it as a mere "paper threat," the Berlin Treaty nonetheless set a symbolic precedent: it was the first international system designed to protect Jews against a sovereign nation-state. With important consequences for the years to come, the treaty implicitly linked the "minority question" to the "the Jewish question." From a Western point of view, the recognition of specific Jewish rights to protection-even if carefully worded and prompted by pragmatic goals-turned East European Jewry into a test case for minority rights. The situation of the Jews was to serve as a paradigm for later architects-often East European Jewish refugees themselves, especially in the 1920s-of modern human rights legislation.
Lynn Rapaport
However, diplomacy (and not internationalist legal theory) is Fink's main focus. From this perspective, it appears that the precedent set at Berlin was quickly forgotten. Between 1878 and the outbreak of the First World War, the situation of Europe's minorities deteriorated rapidly. Following the Balkan wars (1912) (1913) , the Great Powers renounced responsibility for minorities in the region. The outbreak of the war in August 1914 foretold further suffering for those minorities trapped in the Eastern war zones. A fascinating chapter describes the fate of minorities during the war-four years that were "especially catastrophic" for Poles and Jews. Polish combatants were conscripted by Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany to serve, in effect, as cannon fodder. Jewish civilians were displaced en masse and in many places attacked by Russians, Germans, or Poles.
With the multinational empires having disintegrated, the "Great War" served as a magnifier of the minority question in Eastern Europe. In four well-documented chapters, the author turns her attention to the treaties on minorities signed at the Paris Peace Conference. She argues that the Wilsonian principle of self-determination was not necessarily embraced by minorities-who now found themselves absorbed into new and enlarged nation-states. At Versailles, Western demands for protection of minorities were couched in the language of modern citizenship. The wording of these treaties did not explicitly identify persecuted national groups. The so-called "Polish Minority Treaty" of June 1919-a blueprint for later minorities treaties signed with other successor states-required that the signatories provide full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants. For Fink, the treaty represented neither a Jewish victory nor a Polish defeat: Jews obtained little and Poles gave up little. However, guarantees extracted subsequently from signatory states covered in theory more than twenty-five million Jews, Germans, Ukrainians, Hungarians, and other minorities in Eastern Europe. Left in the hands of the inefficient and overly conciliatory League of Nations, enforcement was minimal. Fink describes in detail the League's handling in the 1920s of "minority petitions" (requests from states such as Germany and Poland for arbitration and redress in minority issues). The organization, she argues, was deficient because of its illusory goal of balancing the irreconcilable interests of East European states, national minorities, and the international community. In her view, the failure to protect minorities in the interwar period was due not only to the emergence of Hitler's New Order, but also to the League's chronic inability to confront abusive states.
Yet it should be pointed out that the Geneva system turned out to be fairly effective in providing legal and material protection to minorities turned stateless refugees. Outside the realm of sovereign nation-states, the League engineered an international humanitarian revolution. Whereas Western diplomats shied away from national definitions of minorities, the League granted refugee status, on a collective basis, to designated ethnic and national groups such as Armenians, "White" Russians, and in 1936, Jewish refugees from the Reich. Despite its shortcomings, the League's pioneering role in refugee protection partially compensated for its inability to uphold minority rights. Other outcomes of the diplomacy involved also challenge the author's critical stance. Undeniably, the League's structural weakness-a reflection of the fragility of "collective security" after 1919-was a major aspect of what E.H. Carr dubbed the "Twenty Years' Crisis." Yet after 1945, the opening of the "human rights era" and the West's recognition of Jewish national claims were not simply immediate legacies of the Second World War: they also owed much to the imperfect yet path-breaking "defense of others" that Fink analyzed. These comments aside, this richly detailed and important book displays impressive scholarship. It deserves a wide readership and should be mandatory reading in advanced courses on Europe, human rights, and diplomacy in the twentieth century. 
G. Daniel Cohen

